largely unexplored. 8 The case of PUMC provides a means by which to understand this dynamic. Despite periodic closures and name changes, PUMC remained a distinct institution of advanced medical education and research throughout the 1950s, largely due to the administration of the PLA. This article reveals the mechanisms by which Western biomedicine endured at the College during the early PRC. International relations scholar David Lampton has asserted that the Ministry of Health was a primary basis of political support for Western medicine in China during the early 1950s. 9 But at PUMC the PLA, which oversaw the school from 1952 to 1956, played a critical role in preserving Western medical education at the school via curricular and political reforms. PUMC contributed manpower, training, and resources to Chinese military medicine during a crucial transition period, and in service of these ends, the PLA maintained standards of Western medical education at the College.
After giving an overview of the school's history before 1949, I survey educational and political changes at PUMC, focusing on a key period in the early 1950s when these transformations began. In addition to fostering participation in the Korean War and implementing short-term advanced courses, the PLA launched the Three-Antis Campaign (三反运动 sanfan yundong) against corruption (贪污 tanwu), waste (浪费 langfei), and bureaucratism (官僚主义 guanliao zhuyi), as well as the political rehabilitation of faculty via thought reform (思想改造 sixiang gaizao), at PUMC. In implementing these reforms, the PLA enfolded the school into a growing infrastructure of military medical research and education. These institutional changes recast PUMC as ideologically and politically distinct from its foreign origins, but committed to essentially the same standards and practices of Western biomedicine. The reforms further demonstrated that the PLA, rather than the Ministry of Health, asserted authority to re-legitimize Western medical education at the College. I analyze retrospective accounts of PUMC from students and Western observers, propaganda that CCP organs published, and articles written by College professors. These documents demonstrated that PUMC retained its symbolic role as a national icon of Western biomedicine throughout its institutional transformation. The accounts publicized every step of the school's integration into the CCP, from military reforms to individual doctors' personal renunciations of American cultural imperialism.
A MODEL MEDICAL SCHOOL IN WAR AND REVOLUTION
In 1921, the Rockefeller Foundation and its subsidiary organization, the China Medical Board, established PUMC as an elite school that nurtured a select number of leaders in medicine.
10 PUMC quickly became a prominent institution and model for other schools of Western medicine in China. 11 Students undertook a seven-year curriculum taught exclusively in English, including two years of laboratory science and extensive clinical training. 12 The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War interrupted the "golden years" of PUMC. 13 When Japan took Beijing on 7 July 1937, the invading forces occupied and closed the College. 14 After the Japanese Army withdrew in 1945, the Rockefeller Foundation, China Medical Board, and College Board of Trustees began discussions to reopen PUMC. In 1946, these groups appointed Li Zong'en as Director, and in October, the College reopened with 22 students. 15 However, civil war still raged between the Nationalist and Communist parties, and in the months before CCP forces took control of Beijing on 31 January 1949, American administrators withdrew from PUMC, concerned for their safety. 16 The China Medical Board continued to send operating funds until the United States froze financial connections with China in December 1950. 17 When the Chinese Ministry of Education nationalized PUMC on 20 January 1951, it encountered little opposition.
The American connections and elite identity of PUMC became politically problematic as the PRC established new health policies and administrations. These processes contributed to the consolidation of power as means of implementing mass mobilization and enforcing compliance with state authority. 18 Mao Zedong (毛泽东 1893-1976) articulated the guiding tenets of CCP health policy at the First National Health Conference in 1950, where he stated that medicine should serve the masses, put prevention first, use mass campaign methods, and integrate traditional with Western practices. 19 As a prominent school that trained elite physician-researchers, PUMC was an obvious mismatch with this populist approach to health. Upon nationalization, the Vice-Minister of Education, Qian Junrui (钱俊瑞 1908-1985) , encouraged College staff to "sever completely their relations with American imperialism" and to emphasize austerity and popular education. 20 A 1951 pamphlet asserted that nationalization "extricated [PUMC from] all of American imperialism's fetters, and returned it to the fatherland's embrace." 21 This description of American "fetters" was among the first overt indications that the foreign ties of PUMC were politically problematic. However, the pamphlet suggested the possible rehabilitation of the school, since it presented "returning to the fatherland's embrace" as a viable future for the College. The rhetoric surrounding the nationalization of PUMC articulated the conceptual gap in political identities between the College and the new administration without totally condemning medical education at the school.
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After nationalization, the Ministries of Health and Education promoted antiAmerican discourse at PUMC, but did not enact major reforms. The Ministries recast the China Medical Board and Rockefeller Foundation as American cultural imperialists. Deng Jiadong (邓家栋 1906 -2004 ), a 1933 graduate of the College, wrote in a 1951 People's Daily article that the school's American administration had been "full of poison" and sought "enslavement of the people," using vivid imagery and moral absolutism to identify the College with American imperialism.
23
The Ministries changed the language of instruction at PUMC from English to Chinese in 1951. 24 As a newspaper article on the school declared, "English is the tool used to absorb foreign knowledge, but this tool must be made to serve the people." 25 Although this statement denounced the use of English at the College, it suggested that research at PUMC was valuable for medicine in China, and that there was a place for Chinese scholars within an international community of medical research.
Education at PUMC did not change substantially during the first year of the College's nationalization. In 1951, the Ministry of Health renamed the school the China Union Medical College (中国协和医科大学Zhongguo xiehe yike daxue), or CUMC. 26 The number of students in short-term public health courses rose from 48 to 76, but this increase did not affect the curriculum or standards of coursework and entrance examinations. 27 The Ministry also sent CUMC faculty to teach at the Beijing School for the Further Education of Chinese Medical Practitioners (北京中医进修学校 Beijing zhongyi jinxiu xuexiao). 28 Although doctors of Chinese medicine attended the school, its curriculum used textbooks of Western hygiene, and so the College faculty who taught there did not substantially depart from familiar material. 29 The endurance of research-focused Western biomedicine at 22 Ibid. 23 RADICAL REFORMS UNDER THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, 1952 ARMY, -1956 In 1952, as anti-American sentiment was rising during the Korean War, the PLA took control of CUMC from the Ministries of Health and Education. 31 The PLA directly militarized CUMC, introducing some Soviet and traditional Chinese medical programming, changing the curriculum to provide refresher courses, and revising the patient makeup of the College-affiliated hospital. Throughout the first years of the 1950s, the CCP launched a series of nationwide campaigns to purge bourgeois elements and consolidate power. These included land reform (土地革命 tudi geming) from 1950 to 1952, thought reform of intellectuals, the Campaign to Suppress CounterRevolutionaries (镇压反革命 zhenya fan'geming) in 1951, and the Three-Antis and Five-Antis Campaigns (五反运动 wufan yundong) in 1952-1953. 32 At CUMC, the PLA undertook administrative reforms that largely preserved Western medicine, but also implemented the Three-Antis and thought reform campaigns-which vilified the practitioners of that medicine-to gain political control over medical elites. These reforms established PLA control over CUMC while also preserving Western medical education there, in addition to politically re-orienting its practitioners to align with the CCP. In the process, CUMC provided the PLA with Korean War treatment teams, staff to create its elite 301 Hospital and PLA Thoracic Hospital, and a foundation for its medical research programming.
The PLA was a major force in a populist coalition that set the course of health policy for the CCP in the early PRC. 33 diseases and treat battle wounds during this early period.
36 By 1949, the PLA possessed 350 hospitals and 7 military medical universities across the nation. 37 It faced campaigns to consolidate its power in the south, where malaria and parasitic diseases were endemic.
The PLA stood to gain much-needed manpower, training programs, and research capacity from CUMC. When the Korean conflict broke out in 1950, the military identified a need for better trauma medicine and methods to treat illnesses of nutritional deficiency. 38 These challenges led the PLA to develop medical research of its own. Military medical administration was reorganized under the purview of the General Logistics Department (总后勤部 zonghou qinbu).
39 In 1950, the First National Health Work Conference mandated the strengthening of epidemic prevention and health-care work, vocational training among "old medical cadres," and medical administration in the PLA. 40 The two primary goals for the new Medical Division of the General Logistics Department were the standardization and modernization of military medicine; after programs to learn from the Soviets began in 1952, a third goal of "scientization" (科学化 kexuehua) emerged. 41 The PLA used CUMC in service of this goal of scientization when it took over the College in 1952, with political commissar Zhang Zhiqiang (张之强 1915-2005) as Party Secretary of the affiliated hospital. 42 A year earlier, the PLA had also taken control of Nanjing University Medical School (南京大学医学院 Nanjing daxue yixueyuan). 43 As major sites of Western scientific research, these two schools, especially CUMC, could provide the expertize necessary to improve military medicine.
The militarization of CUMC established the authority of the PLA there and integrated the school into the national military medical infrastructure. After 40 Zhu, Gao, and Gong, Zhongguo junshi yixueshi, 391 -2. 41 Ibid. 42 A native of Henan and minor official at the Yan'an base camps, Zhang was appointed to the administrative committee of CUMC after 1949. Lei Yunfeng, Yan'an ming ren ci dian (Dictionary of Famous Figures from Yan'an) (Xianggang: Guoji yanhuang wenhua chubanshe, 2002), 427. According to Li Zhisui, Zhang was the antithesis of the PUMC ideal: "Zhang was a coarse and uneducated man, but he was an old revolutionary, and in those days being revolutionary was considered qualification enough." Tai Hung-chao, trans., The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician (New York: Random House, 1994), 214. 43 The school was renamed the China Eastern Military Medical School (华东军医学院 Huadong jun yixueyuan). Zhu, Gao, and Gong, Zhongguo junshi yixueshi, 427. taking over CUMC, the PLA enlisted all of its faculty and students. 44 Security became much more extensive, and the school followed strict lines of military authority. "No outsider is allowed to enter without being stopped at the gate, questioned whom he wishes to see or for what other purpose he comes," wrote Reinhard Hoeppli (1893 -1973), a Swiss national who remained at CUMC as head of parasitology until 1952, of the changes that militarization had wrought by October of that year. 45 He continued, "A special paper is signed, eventually a telephone call is made and then you may go in," indicating newly opaque lines of authority. 46 Restrictions on access to the school, and the issuance of special passes to staff members, were the most obvious signs of this transformation. Hoeppli added, "All corridors are swarming with people, males and females, most of them in yellow-green military uniform." 47 Because the Army formalized relationships between its personnel along lines of military authority, the new organization created an atmosphere very different from the American-run College, where students and faculty had held Christmas parties and sang holiday carols together as late as 1949. 48 The PLA involved CUMC in direct military action when it sent a surgical team of faculty and students to the front lines of the Korean conflict. Medical schools across China reportedly sent such teams to Korea; these groups gave vaccinations, sprayed DDT, and carried out other hygienic work. 49 In Korea, CUMC faculty and staff gave surgical care to wounded soldiers. 50 In Changchun, College chief of surgery Wu Yingkai (吴英凯 1910 -2003) joined military medical teams that treated soldiers wounded in action. 51 The PLA also turned the CUMC teaching hospital into an Army infirmary where soldiers could receive treatment for their injuries and illnesses. 52 Nursing students provided care to the troops, and College faculty and students provided their beds and donated blood to the soldiers. 53 This process both completed the militarization of CUMC and suggested that medical education had militarized more broadly across the nation.
As part of its anti-American rejection of Western influences on CUMC, the PLA encouraged new models for medical education there. Following a nationwide 44 Ibid. imperative to "learn from the Soviets" (学习苏联 xuexi Sulian) during the early 1950s, the Soviet Union provided such a model. 54 In 1952, the College-affiliated hospital established a committee to "learn from the Soviets," which emphasized techniques for painless childbirth and Soviet organization of medical care. 55 In the following year, each department of CUMC set up a teaching and research section to study Soviet educational organization, curricula, and pedagogy. CUMC also began to teach Russian-language classes and on Pavlovian conditioning. 56 The hospital's Party Secretary, Zhang Zhiqiang, encouraged painless childbirth, electrosleep therapy, and other clinical practices popular in the USSR. 57 However, these methods were not implemented as rigid regulations and did not seem to permanently transform medical education at CUMC. 58 This light influence aligned with the broader priorities of the PLA medical corps, which had found Soviet reorganizations to be generally ineffective by 1954. 59 Accompanying the study of Soviet training was a continuation of attempts to join traditional and Western medicine. In 1954, the PLA made CUMC one of the first major hospitals to accept traditional Chinese medicine practitioners as interns. 60 However, the medicine that doctors practiced at the school's hospital remained predominantly Western. The most extensive incorporation of traditional medicine into the work of College staff was the development of research on the scientific interpretation of traditional medicines' effects and usefulness. A 1956 newspaper article detailing this effort to integrate the two medical systems claimed that the College's department of pharmacology had discovered that ginseng panax (人参属 renshen shu), a traditional herbal treatment for fatigue, was also a useful treatment for diabetes because of its effect on blood sugar levels. 61 In this case, as with most similar research, doctors and researchers demonstrated the efficacy of Chinese drugs according to ultimately predominant Western medical principles and standards. Such a focus on the scientific value of Chinese drugs suited the priorities of the PLA in using Western medical education to bolster its military medical endeavors.
The teaching hospital affiliated with CUMC became an important site of military reform. PLA reforms there revealed motives to preserve CUMC as a national symbol of Western biomedicine. After 1952, the hospital established morning rally meetings, a comprehensive duty program in which doctors were to be available 24-hours a day, and a system in which patients were assigned a treating physician 54 63 decried a longstanding policy of accepting patients according to the educational value they provided medical students in favor of a policy that was more generous to military personnel. 64 Rao explained an important problem facing PLA medical organizations: the issue of disabled veterans. Following over 20-years of conflict with the Nationalist Party, Japan, and the United States, many soldiers and cadres who "fought a hundred battles" and were wounded in conflict had failed to receive adequate treatment and faced permanent incapacitation. Many of these personnel sought medical treatment in the early 1950s, but as their pathologies had become chronic, they were barred from inhospital services. 65 Veterans across the nation looked to the CUMC Hospital as a bastion of highquality Western clinical care. This nationwide prominence both enabled the preservation of Western medicine at CUMC and forced its hospital to admit general patients whose pathologies held less instructional value. "Because Xiehe's [CUMC's] prestige within the country is very high, in local places where cures have not worked, all are entrusted to Xiehe as a last resort," explained Rao, who suggested that barring entry of veterans to CUMC might cause social unrest. Rao claimed that if patients who "cherished such great dreams to come to Xiehe" were not admitted because their pathologies lacked educational value or were classified as chronic, "then it may produce a very bad influence." Therefore, the hospital could not use educational value as the only standard by which to accept patients, but rather must accept some veterans, even if their cases were chronic and common. "This also conforms to the responsibility of China Union Medical College to resolve the difficult illnesses of the whole army," explained Rao. 66 The prestige of the CUMC Hospital to Chinese citizens made it a useful symbol of Chinese technical achievement, worthy of preservation by the PLA-although this symbolism also ultimately limited its value as a teaching hospital.
The PLA changed the student body and tailored the curriculum at CUMC to accommodate military medical students, although the courses themselves remained specialized. In 1952, the PLA closed the school to undergraduates and medical students, instead offering graduate-level courses for Army medical officers who needed to learn current methods of surgery and emergency care. 67 The goal was to improve military medicine by educating "high-quality, qualified teachers." 68 The courses were limited to one year and were organized by department to focus on particular medical specialties. 69 This graduate "refresher" coursework aligned the CUMC with other military medical universities, the PLA Academy of Medical Sciences (中国人民解放军医学科学院 Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun yixue kexueyuan), and military hospitals. 70 The College also became a major part of PLA plans to develop proprietary medical research. In August 1951, the PLA had established its own Academy of Medical Sciences in Shanghai. 71 In 1954, the PLA accepted its first class of military medical research students. Twelve began classes at the new Academy in Shanghai, but most-forty-one-began classes at CUMC.
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Historians Zhu Kewen, Gao Enxian, and Gong Chun have stated that these courses fostered critical development of "fundamental medical skills" within the armed forces. 73 The aim of most research was to support national defense for new technologies of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare, as well as to provide specialties relevant to the armed forces such as field surgery and aeronautical medicine. 74 Instead of cultivating an elite group of scholars and administrators, CUMC now targeted mid-level military doctors and researchers, but the goal of advanced education and research remained.
HUNTING TIGERS AND CONFESSING IMPERIALISM: POLITICAL REFORMS UNDER THE PLA
The armed forces provided CUMC with patriotic work, but the school's American past haunted it. Even as PLA reforms largely preserved research-based Western biomedical education within CUMC, instead focusing primarily on changes in the duration and student makeup of courses, Party leadership at CUMC publicly vilified the professors responsible for that education. Political campaigns at CUMC, notably the Three-Antis Campaign and thought reform, differentiated medicine there from its geographic origins in the West. These processes restored the political legitimacy of CUMC under the PLA, allowing it to continue as a symbol of Western medical education and permitting its graduates to return, eventually, to elite positions.
The Three-Antis Campaign swept Chinese bureaucratic and educational institutions from December 1951 to mid-1952. As an exemplar of American influence on Chinese medical science, CUMC was an obvious target. The national campaign 68 Ibid. 70 Zhu, Gao, and Gong, Zhongguo junshi yixue shi, 434 -5. 71 Ibid., 402. 72 Ibid., 434. 73 Ibid., 629. 74 Ibid., 420.
identified former Nationalist government, political, and industry officials and accused them of the titular "Three Antis" of corruption, waste, and bureaucratism. 75 The movement labeled its targets "tigers" (老虎 laohu) and employed "tiger-hunting teams" (打虎队 dahudui) to prosecute them. 76 Articles in the Beijing press identified high-ranking individuals at CUMC as the school's "tigers." These criticisms were not new, 77 but in the socialist context, they implied a greater personal danger for faculty and staff at the College.
The Three-Antis Campaign linked corruption, waste, and bureaucratism at CUMC to subversive American influences. A 1952 People's Daily article alleged, "Under the 'green-tiled roof of the palatial CUMC' is a huge pile of rotten stuff." 78 Since the "green-tiled" roof referred to the classical architecture that the Rockefeller Foundation had employed in constructing the school, the statement linked the "rotten stuff" of corruption with the wealth and status traditionally associated with the College. 79 Party attacks on CUMC also targeted graft and embezzlement. They singled out "tigers" like Li Weigang (李维纲), a head nurse in emergency services who allegedly "just wanted to steal everything," from bandages and syringes to the clothes of deceased patients, or pharmacist Wang Xiyao (王希尧), who was said to steal codeine and in its place dispense counterfeit medicines made from starch and glucose. 80 In addition to attacking these targets in the press, Party committees sent people like "Archie" Zhang Chengping (张承平), a head engineer who allegedly stole plumbing and other machine equipment from the school, to re-education camps.
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One 1952 article claimed that College staff stole a total of 3.7 billion Chinese yuan, roughly equivalent to USD1.5 million today, or approximately one-quarter the school's 1949-50 planned operating budget of USD600,000.
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Although ideological criticisms of the College during the Three-Antis Campaign were vitriolic, they did not target the Western medical curriculum of the school. The Party's allegations of graft implied a tacit support for the medical research that it claimed had suffered from embezzlement. For instance, one People's Daily article accused the China Medical Board of corruption because medical education at CUMC had not met scientific standards. The unnamed author wrote, "One of the professors here set out to write a thesis which was supposed to be up to 'CUMC standard' and 'international level.'" The author claimed that the unnamed professor had knowingly used contaminated sheep blood samples for a project. 83 By criticizing the corrupted standards of medical research, the article implicitly endorsed Western medicine, based upon quantitative biological research, as an ideal. The Party claimed to support a global standard of Western medical education and used this standard to criticize physicians who did not measure up.
At CUMC, the Three-Antis Campaign demonstrated the consequences of not aligning with the CCP: defamation, public shaming, and dismissal, as in the cases of Li Weikang and Wang Xiyao. 84 The campaign showcased the new state's ability to communicate to its citizens via state media, as in the People's Daily articles that discussed the campaign at CUMC. 85 The movement promoted the PLA as a replacement for American administration of CUMC. A 1952 People's Daily article stated that after the campaign ended, College personnel "put into order tens of thousands of testing tubes."
86 Whereas "bourgeois" American influences had caused CUMC to waste resources, the new administration of the PLA fostered a College that made efficient use of equipment and materials. That the Army considered it critical to save and organize test tubes-themselves symbolic of the scientific basis of Western medicine-spoke to its support of this scientific system of medicine and the place of American science in medical education in the new PRC.
Although the Three-Antis Campaign targeted administrators and staffers at CUMC, thought reform targeted physicians and medical researchers as intellectuals (知识分子 zhishifenzi).
87 Inspired by Soviet models, thought reform opposed Anglo-American influences, self-interest, and elitism. Starting in 1951, Party representatives at universities-usually students-introduced self-criticism methods and directed school heads to lead branch committees on thought reform. As a result, many academics published articles in newspapers confessing their crimes of Western influence, elitism, and self-interest. 88 The confessions of intellectuals followed a uniform pattern and were no different at CUMC. They were autobiographical, demonstrated concrete examples of ideological errors, and ended with a passionate committal to class struggle and the anti-American principles of the Party. 89 The confessions documented the authors' ideological reform and suggested that thought reform was ubiquitous, reinforcing the pressure that the Party placed on intellectuals to undergo the process. 90 At CUMC, three 1952 newspaper articles presented personal accounts of thought reforms and demonstrated methods of political self-repudiation and reintegration. 91 The authors were President Li Zong'en, pharmacologist Zhou Jinhuang (周金黄 1909 -1999), and gynecologist Lin Qiaozhi (林巧稚 1901 -1983) . 92 Common themes in these articles suggested specific methods in which personal endorsements of Party ideology reintegrated Western biomedicine into the administrative structure and logic of the CCP. These included authors' discussions of their class backgrounds, admissions that their education had corrupted them and made them self-interested elites, and vows to henceforth use their skills for the benefit of the Chinese people and military.
Although American and Chinese observers have cast aspersions on the validity of self-repudiations during thought reform, these articles reflected extant social forces in China at the time of their writing. In 1953, Hoeppli stated that the written statements of College professors who claimed conversion to Communist ideology were "more a thing of the mouth than of the heart." 93 Historian Aminda Smith has claimed that Chinese who underwent thought reform had no agency in their confessions at all. 94 Asian studies scholar Theodore Chen has suggested that because the confessions of academics who underwent thought reform all followed the same pattern, they were probably not genuine opinions. 95 However, writer Suzanne Pepper has pointed out that the compliance of professors with thought reform was not solely the consequence of coercion or social pressure. 96 Psychiatrist Robert Lifton has supported this viewpoint, claiming that self-repudiation was a deeply emotional process, even though confessions themselves may have appeared wooden. 97 Although it may be impossible to divine the true intent behind the words of these confessions, the documents still stand as testament to political pressures at the time and shed light on Party treatment of medical experts.
Lin, Li, and Zhou began their statements by stressing their innocent origins and the corruption of their youth by Western education. Lin wrote, "It was in 1921 that I left my native country Fukien [福建 Fujian] despite all hardships, and came to the north with all the zeal of the youth." Lin stressed that her education transformed her life from its humble origins, saying, "It was no small matter 30-years ago for a girl to come all the way from Amoy to Peking to study in the PUMC." 98 However, the naïveté of young students had left them susceptible to foreign influence, leading to their early, blind acceptance of American cultural imperialism at PUMC. Lin wrote, "I began to realize fully how U.S. imperialism carried out its cultural aggression in the 'PUMC,'" and bemoaned her ignorance at the time, saying, "I have all these years been fooled." 99 Zhou noted that although PUMC had trained him as an expert with scientific and scholarly ambitions, "behind this ideal lay another: to join together the worship of American imperialism with individualism." 100 Li suggested that the atmosphere of the American-run College encouraged his self-interest and elitism. Once Li took up a position teaching and researching at the College, he "enjoyed the reputation of a scholar. The remuneration was high. Life was comfortable. All these satisfied my selfish desires." 101 The rhetoric of this self-criticism suggests that the American-influenced tenor of academic life at Peking Union Medical College-but not necessarily the actual research Li did-was what had allegedly corrupted him.
Once the author acknowledged the errors of his or her corruption under American influence, he or she claimed to have experienced a moral conversion from his or her elitist, bourgeois perspective to a nationalist rejection of Western "cultural aggression" and identification with Party ideology. The authors of these accounts described these conversions as independent of the actual medicine they practiced. For example, Lin traced this revelation to a specific moment, saying that after she visited an exhibit which accused the American military of conducting bacteriological warfare in Korea, she "saw clearly U.S. imperialism's ambition of aggression on China." 102 The authors described a turning point in which they rejected their American educations and endorsed the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, choosing to work for "the people." Zhou realized that his PUMC education had "poisoned" him with the ideology of American imperialism and cultural aggression. This poison, he claimed, had left him "unable to love the motherland and people" and "lacking in spiritual struggle." Zhou resolved, "Today, I must thoroughly criticize everything about the old PUMC." 103 Although these physicians had rejected their own Western medical educations as part of a corrupt system, their repudiations did not preclude them from continuing to teach Western medicine to Chinese students.
Descriptions of this moment of conversion protected the place of Western scientific medicine in China because they occurred on a deeply personal level. Because the authors described their conversions in terms of subjective, individual moralities and opinions, they were able to explicitly reject the cultural and social context in which they had learned American scientific medicine without necessarily rejecting that medical system itself. For example, in 1951, journalist Pu Xixiu (浦熙修 1910 -1970) claimed that these personal revelations had achieved a moral conversion for the entire institution. She wrote, "After its return to the fold of the Chinese people, Peking Union Medical College is now resuscitated spiritually." 104 When the doctors of PUMC switched overt allegiances from the China Medical Board to the CCP, so did the medicine they practiced.
After the authors published self-repudiations, they continued their careers in medicine. Lin Qiaozhi became the chair of obstetrics and gynecology at CUMC. She held a variety of high-ranking positions on national health organizations and was a "friendship delegate" to Great Britain, Belgium, and France. 105 After participating in military medical research during the Korean War, in 1958 Zhou joined the PLA Academy of Military Medical Sciences, where he earned a secondclass commendation. In 1963, he joined the CCP. 106 Only Li Zong'en suffered in his career. In 1959, he was sent down to Kunming after being labeled an anti-rightist in the Party's 1957 purges, and became a researcher at Kunming Medical University (昆明医科大学 Kunming yike daxue). In 1962 he died there after an unspecified illness; the Ministry of Health posthumously rehabilitated his name "as one who had been wrongly accused." 107 The Three-Antis and thought reform movements at CUMC publicly vilified the American Rockefeller administration at the school. In 1952, the PLA delivered its most trenchant criticism of this history when it opened an exhibit on the history of CUMC at the Forbidden City. That the PLA chose such a prominent site for the exhibit emphasized the iconic role of the College as a national symbol of Western scientific medicine in China. The exhibit featured pictures and texts that asserted American abuses of Chinese students and patients at the College. One of the most sensational exhibits presented photographs and case studies of two patients whom American physician R.S. Lyman treated for psychotic schizophrenia, claiming that Lyman had killed them by exposing their brains to X-rays "in violation of normal scientific practice."
108 By framing Americans' wrongdoing as a violation of scientific norms, the exhibit implied that "normal scientific practice" itself-which, in the context of CUMC, referred to Western medical education and research-was a legitimate pursuit in the new People's Republic.
During the administration of the PLA from 1952 until 1956, the Three-Antis, thought reform, and militarization movements vilified American influences at CUMC and transformed it into a military institution that dispensed specialized Western medical training to army medics. These processes changed the political context and recipients of Western medical education at CUMC, but also permitted the reintegration of this Western-style educational system into Chinese society. This process of reintegration was articulated most clearly through a play, Bright Skies (明朗的天 Minglang de tian), which noted playwright Cao Yu (曹禺1910 -1996) published in 1956 and performed at the Beijing People's Art Theatre that year. The play examined a Western medical college in Beijing named "Yen Jen Medical College," a thinly veiled fictional version of PUMC. The central character was Professor Ling Shixiang (凌士湘), a bacteriologist in his fifties who had trained under the school's American administration. The narrative followed Ling's ideological reformation as he resisted the intrusion of politics into research and educational work at the school. At the dramatic climax, Party affiliates confronted Ling with evidence that American professors had experimented on Chinese patients and used the research of Chinese scientists to conduct bacteriological warfare in the Korean conflict. Ling then realized that the Americans who had operated the institution were reprehensible figures. 109 The internal conflict that Ling expressed several times, questioning the extent to which American politics corrupted American science, is one that pervaded CUMC. As in the confessions of Lin, Li, and Zhou, Ling realized that his American teachers had corrupted his identity as a Chinese doctor. Finally, he set out to lead an "antigerm-warfare work team" to Korea. The reformed physician took up a position of honour and planned to use his scientific expertize to aid the Chinese cause against the U.S. One of his final lines read, "Look, my microscope-this is my gun!" 110 In interpreting the microscope as a literal weapon in service of the Korean War effort, Cao suggested that the Western biomedical tradition this instrument symbolized was also a powerful and legitimate tool for the Chinese people and state. 111 Under Wu, the Thoracic Hospital pioneered Chinese development of right heart catheterization, diagnosis of cardiovascular disease, and hemodynamic research. 112 CUMC thus continued to supply medical leadership to China-via the armed forces, rather than civilian research institutes.
The PLA also ensured a space within the CUMC Hospital for high-profile patients, establishing the PLA as a viable provider of Western medical care for military brass and foreign visitors. In October 1953, the second clinical institute at CUMC (协和医学院第二临床学院 Xiehe yixueyuan di er linchuan xueyuan) became a separate hospital to treat top PLA officers; in July 1954, it became the independent 301 Hospital (中国人民解放军总医院 Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zong yiyuan, or 301医院 301 yiyuan) and became the most highly regarded hospital in the PLA system. 113 Although top Party leaders went to the Beijing Hospital (北京医院 Beijing yiyuan) for treatment, the 301 Hospital and China Hospital (中国医院 Zhongguo yiyuan), also on the CUMC campus, served high-level government officials as well. 114 In February 1951, the central government united the China Hospital with the CUMC Hospital under the Medical Division of the PLA General Logistics Department and the new title China Union Hospital (中国协和医院 Zhongguo xiehe yiyuan). 115 Rao noted that in addition to the work of the hospital in treating difficult diseases within the military, its purpose was also to "accept and cure international friends."
116 CUMC thus helped the PLA establish its top clinical facilities. The military seems to have benefited most from the resources and manpower of CUMC during the early 1950s, possibly because the school's political notoriety precluded top Party or civilian organizations from aligning too closely with it.
After the authority of the People's Liberation Army at CUMC ended in 1956, the school embarked upon an administrative cycle of Westernizing reforms followed by political condemnations, which repeated itself several times until the 1980s. In 1957, the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (中国医学科学院 Zhongguo yixue kexue yuan) absorbed CUMC as a subsidiary research institute. Soon after, the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" (百花运动 baihua yundong) led Wu Yingkai and Li Zong'en to protest Communist Party policies, and the Academy held a series of 12 campaigns to castigate those who spoke out, especially Li. 117 In 1959, the school accepted students once again as the Chinese Medical University (中国医科大学 Zhongguo yike daxue). By 1961, the College had regained its position as China's leading medical school and research center, 118 and it again had an 8-year curriculum that accepted only 60 students per year. 119 By 1967, the hospital affiliated with the College, then called the Peking Union Hospital (Beijing xiehe yiyuan 北京协和医院), had become a major hub of medical science, receiving the bulk of national biomedical research funding. Until the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, the College graduates and faculty had dominated the leadership of the Chinese Medical Association (中华医学会 Zhonghua yixue hui), as well as the Chinese Medical Journal (中华医学杂志 Zhonghua yixue zazhi).
120 It seemed that by the dawn of the Cultural Revolution, then, the old PUMC had become much what it was before 1949.
During the Cultural Revolution, the cycle of self-repudiation repeated itself. Red Guards (红卫兵 Hong weibing) changed the name of the school's teaching hospital to the "Peking Anti-Imperialism Hospital" (北京反帝医院 Beijing fandi yiyuan). 121 The school closed in 1970 as conflict engulfed the nation, and a new wave of excoriations targeted the Medical College of China. In November 1968, the English-language CCP publication China Reconstructs published an article on the College entitled "U.S. Imperialist Cultural Aggression Disguised as Friendship." The authors reiterated old accusations of elitism and American cultural imperialism and torture of Chinese patients. To these it added new charges, notably that the school was a training site for "cultural secret agents" who collected data on Chinese environment and politics for the United States. 122 Although the medical school was closed, the affiliated teaching hospital continued to function, and in 1971, it made headlines in the United States. In that year, James Reston, a New York Times journalist, visited Beijing and had an emergency appendectomy at the AntiImperialism Hospital. Reston's vivid account of his procedure, complete with details of post-operative acupuncture to alleviate pain, political activism at the hospital, and short biographies of the physicians he met, provided American readers with a glimpse of medicine in China. "It is not exactly what the Rockefeller Foundation had in mind when it created the Peking Union Medical College," concluded Reston, "but like everything else in China these days, it is on its way toward some different combination of the very old and the very new." 123 Academy of Medical Sciences, and Zhou Shoukai (周寿恺 1906-1970) became the vice-president of Zhongshan Medical College (中山医学院 Zhongshan yixueyuan).
126
Peking Union Medical College was, and is, much more than a philanthropic project that ended in 1949. The transformation of PUMC into a Western medical school that also became a cornerstone of the modern Chinese health-care infrastructure is as compelling as its history before the establishment of the People's Republic. Much as the College had been a symbol of the establishment of Western medicine in China under its American administration, under the PLA and CCP, PUMC became a sign of the sinification and militarization of Western medicine and knowledge. The prominence of the PLA in the rehabilitation of CUMC suggests that the armed forces were a powerful agent in shaping civilian medicine. In the early 1950s, PUMC became one of the first symbols of a new medicine in China, one in which the Chinese state-and especially its military arm-asserted authority over Western medical education within its borders.
